학술지
KER
Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining
James Andreoni · Marco Castillo · Ragan Petrie발행년도 2009Vol. 25No. 1
초록
The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bar-gaining behavior in recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a clear picture of responders’ utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in which responders’ can “shrink” an offer as well as to accept or reject it. This allows us to observe enough about responders’ preferences to estimate utility functions. We use data collected from convex ultimatum games to successfully predict behavior in standard games. Rejections can be “rationalized” with neo-classical preferences overown- and other-payoff that are convex, nonmonotonic, and regular. 
