Family Law, Development and Economic Performance of Muslim Females: A Cross-National Study

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Abstract

This analysis examines whether Islam has direct relationship through Sharia law with Muslim women's social and work behaviors based on quantitative methodology. At first, we examine the extent to how Islamic law influence gender based development all around the world, then comparing Muslim countries, an Islamic family law data set has been used to show that countries with higher scores on Islamic family law tend to have lower female development. To examine which individual level factors caused the support to Islam related restrictive ideas, World Value Survey has been used at the final stage. This paper by using cross country analysis shows that lower degree of female development differs by the degree of Islamic legislation and individual decisions to support this lower status of females may deserve more attention than the country level variables.

Keywords: female labor force participation, family law, Sharia Law, development index, Muslim majority societies, Islamic legislation, WVS,

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I.   Introduction

Religion is a prominent dimension of culture; and even though the social scientists believed that industrialization would lead to a gradual decrease in its influence, today overall religiosity is increasing because most of the societies do not have existential security. People live with insecure conditions tend to be mistrustful of rapid change, emphasizing the communal ties derived from religion (Norris& Inglehart, 2003). Many scholars have analyzed religion, however there is a less consensus about what it is related to Islam that matters for women or why and how it matters for the economic performance of entire country.

This paper suggests that the economic and social development of women in Muslim majority countries is heavily influenced by Islamic family laws. Why do some countries have laws that protect women's rights while others do not? Does Islamic law have the potential to influence economic performance of entire female population in a country? This study analyzes the effects of Islamic law provisions on development of Muslim women to provide some answers to these questions for next generations' social development and economic performance. However it is not the purpose of this study to undertake a general review of women's status in Islam or the degree of religiosity or faith for any society. Even though gender equality is one of the fundamental human rights providing equal opportunities, it is not the main discussion of this analysis either. This paper simply probes overall levels of national developments for females and males separately.

In spite of the difficulties in obtaining data with some Muslim societies, this study is embarked on to doing cross-country analysis by using the most recent available data. The same idea with three dimension human development index of UN is adopted with health, education, and economics for each sex separately. These female and male development indexes exhibit a general picture about the development of women yet does not answer all questions that this paper is seeking for. Then, a new set of data on Islamic family law index is calculated by adopting Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon's family law index. Adding this index into analysis shows that countries with higher scores on Islamic family law index tend to have lower female education enrollment and economic participation. In order to examine how individual level support for Islamic norms and traditional ideas affect support for Islamic legislation, World Value Survey is used for the final stage of the analysis. The results show that single, higher educated and employed people are less supportive to the Islam related restrictive ideas for women.

The findings reported in this paper address, first time in all literature, some answers for level of Islam in family law legislation and female development. The research is presented as follows. Section 2 discusses the mainstream literature on the female role in economics and social life under religious legislation. Section 3 gives a brief description about what is Islamic Sharia law and why it matters for family law. Section 4 lays out the cross country analysis approach, presents the gender based development data and Islamic family law index along with micro level analysis by using World Value Survey. Section 5 presents the regression results. Section 6 summarizes and suggests avenues for future research.

II.   Literature Review

According to Morrison and Jutting (2005), the economic role of women is affected by three factors; social institutions, women's access to resources, and the level of development of the country. Social institutions as religion and law can be the driving force for the public opinion, affecting the access the resources and the economic development of an entire country. The neoclassical approach holds that gender inequalities caused by these social norms are likely to decline as country develops. Using the World Values Survey data over 80 countries, Norris and Inglehart (2004) present the empirical evidence that trending away from religiosity was generally true for advanced industrial societies, but we may not say the same for developing countries. It was obvious that the economic growth alone was not enough to solve all inequalities against women. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, are as rich as Sweden or Norway in per capita GDP, but women in these countries are usually restricted whereas conditions for women are more favorable in some poorer countries such as Ireland and Estonia (Forsythe, Korzeniewicz and Durrant).

By the end of the 1980s, some scholars have analyzed the variation in women's rights in restrictive family law (Moghadam 2003; Musawah 2009), but little research has attempted a global approach for religion especially for Islam. Later, at the end of the century many other scholars have emphasized the role that religion plays in family law (Moghadam 2009; Razavi and Jenichen 2010). Some scholars working with broad cross-national perspective focused on all religions together or connected degree of religiosity of a society to gender inequality, state or just the law (Alexander and Welzel 2009; Cherif 2010, Donno and Russett 2004).

In 1990s, considerable human rights literature has begun to focus only on Muslim societies.

Many scholars have studied democratization in terms of human rights across the Muslim countries (Moaddel, 2006; Tessler and Altinoglu, 2004). They have found that democratization is deeply related with the cultural background and political stability of a country. As Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that the core clash between the Islamic world and the Western world centers on issues concerning gender equality rather than democratic governance. Syed, Ozbilgin, Torunoglu and Ali (2009) examined the status of gender equality at the interface of religious ideologies in economic environment only in two Muslim majority countries, Turkey as a secular state and Pakistan as a Islamic republic. They have found that women's participation in technical and professional jobs is low in both countries regardless of their democratic or secular statements: 26% in Pakistan and 30% in Turkey.

Majority of scholars agree that education can change women's behaviors and their preferences ranging from fertility to labor decisions (Cannonier and Mocan 2012, Lavy and Zablotsky 2011, Heath and Jayachandran, 2016). Especially in Muslim majority countries, to avoid early fertility which may end up with maternal mortality, female education may be the key element to break the vicious cycle of society's religious traditions for women. Other studies show that when women have an independent source of income, they tend to gain more influence within the family (Iverson and Rosenbluth 2006).

Despite all different approaches it can be concluded as; traditions, religion, and law have huge influence on female education and labor force participation in developing countries. By Norris and Inglehart 2004, it is assumed that culture matters but it remains unclear how much it matters as compared to over all levels of social development and legal structures; and in this paper, I will try to find some empirical evidence on this debate.

III.   Family Law, Sharia, and Its Regulations

The family law exists in many forms, such as civil code in Europe, common law of the United States, or Islamic law throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Such laws contain the rules of marriage and divorce; respective rights, and capacities of spouses; marital property; child custody; and inheritance arrangements.

Sharia is the general term used for entire Islamic legal system. It is derived from in order of priority, Quran, Sunnah (decisions and sayings of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him), reasoning by Islamic scholars from principles by Quran and Sunnah; and lastly, the

consensus of the legal community. According to Islam, every word of Quran is perceived as divine and cannot be challenged. Neither Prophet Muhammad nor any other human being had any influence over the divine book. However, Quran is not a legal code; out of 6237 of its verses, only 190 of them contain legal provisions and the rest covers the religious duties and obligations. By tenth century A.D., the legal community of Islam concluded that it is not possible to have any further improvement of divine law, due to respect to early scholars. This event, known as "the closing of the door of *'ijtihad'* (independent reasoning)," froze the divine law at that point. Since then, Sharia judges are forbidden to change, modify, or extend the law (Coulson, 1978).

Under the Sharia law, a wife must obey their husbands and she needs her husband's permission to work, travel and to leave the house. If she is not married then the father or the eldest son of the family holds the parental power over minor children and all females living in that household. A son inherits twice as much as a daughter does, and a widower has far more rights to the deceased spouse's possessions than does a widow (Sura 4:7–11, 12). In courts male witnesses count twice as much as female witnesses which is allowed only in property cases. Sharia law states that a man can have up to four wives without any limitation on the other hand a non-Muslim man who marries a Muslim woman can be punishable by death. A man can unilaterally divorce his wife however a woman needs her husband's consent or the court's approval about if he is insane or he fails to maintain her, deserts her, or treats her cruelly.

Today, only few countries in the world are ruled by only the Islamic law. Aayesha Rafiq introduces three groups: in the first, Islam is legally the State religion and Sharia is usually given a major place in legislation such as Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan. In the second group Islam is not the official religion but the personal law for Muslims is generally drawn from Sharia such as Indonesia and Nigeria. In the last group there is no legally recognized religion and no Islam based law such as Kazakhstan, Turkey and Albania.

IV.   Data and Estimation Methods; Quantifying Islam

The analysis is based on quantitative methodology and proceeds in three stages. The first set of analysis examines whether the pattern of gender based indexes differ between Islamic law. The second stage uses an Islamic family law data set which is specifically estimated for this study while the final set uses World Value Survey to examine the effects of individual level factors.

IV.I. Development Index

The development indexes measure gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, and economics. Female and Male Development Indexes are the geometric mean of normalizes indexes of these three dimensions.

[Figure 1 Here]

[Figure 2 Here]

The country groups are classified according to the principles of Aayesha Rafiq: the first group is named as 'Sharia' and the second group as 'Sharia Personal Law'. The countries that are members of Islam world but using no Islam law are named as 'No Sharia- Islam' and lastly the fourth group is named as 'No Islam' (Appendix Table.A1). Figure (1) and (2) show the difference of Female and Male Development index under Islam related country groups.

To be included, a country must have data available for a minimum of 4 indicators out of the 8 and nearly 160 countries were ultimately covered in here. Missing data is marked on each relevant Country Profile in Appendix, Table.A4. It can be said that the analysis here uses the entire universe of cases, instead of a sample from a population. This means any difference found here, are real differences. The following variables make up the development index data sets:

Education Index

Keeping girls at home after puberty is typical for Muslim countries. Public activities are easily linked with dishonored behavior for the family and decreases marriage chances. Even without any suspicious act, continued education of women after their teens will still mean a delay in marriage and birth. Education Index is calculated with mean years of schooling, adult literacy, net primary, net secondary and gross tertiary enrollment rates. First minimum and maximum values are set according to Human Development Index's standardization. Second, dimension indexes are calculated for each indicator separately then the arithmetic mean of the five resulting indexes is taken. For both sexes, the index is calculated separately (Appendix Table.A2).

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Economics Index

       The economic role of women is very difficult to measure and to counter any problems, labor force participation rate and the estimated earned income are used together. Estimated earned income and labor force participation rate for males and females are transformed into dimension indexes, according to Human Development Index Office's defined minimum and maximum values. Then, the arithmetic mean of the two resulting indexes is taken.

Health Index

       According to the UNDP, the life-expectancy ratio at birth primarily measures differences in the access to health services over lifetime of an individual. Some scholars used total fertility rate and the percentage of women's access to birth control to analyze women's status (Morrison and Jutting). The comparison of female and male has been intended in this analysis that's why only life expectancy ratio is used for health index. By using defined minimum and maximum values according to UN, dimension indexes are calculated. Since there is only one variable used for health index, the calculated dimension index automatically becomes the final health index. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table (1) and Table (2).

[Table 1 Here]

[Table 2 Here]

    I first ran regressions for gender related development indexes to obtain correlations to understand how estimated gender based indexes co-varies with country level explanatory variables. To evaluate the cross national relationships, I first calculated the model as follows:

$$Yi = \delta_1 + \delta_2 law + \beta_1 lgdppercap + \beta_2 politicalstability + \beta_3 lgpop + \beta_4 urban + \beta_5 region + u_i$$

where i =1,2,.., I stands for the country, *lgdppercap* is the log of GDP per capita, *urban* is the urbanization rate as a percentage of total population, *politicalstability* is the composite index of political stability indicators from World Bank, *lgpop* is the share of the log population in million, *law* is a dummy variable for the presence/level of Sharia law, *region* is a fixed effect for region which are classified by World Bank, and u_i is the idiosyncratic error term that represents

unobserved factors that affect Y_i. I also ran the model with each of the individual components of FDI and MDI as dependent variable to evaluate whether one of the components were driving the larger relationship between indexes and country level variables on the basis of religious legislation.

IV.II. Islamic Family Law Index

Measuring religion is a difficult task and building state-level religion data is still underdeveloped in the social sciences (Fox, 2008). In order to examine how countries' Sharia implementations affect development of females, the new data set of Islam and family law provisions are used. Islamic Family Law Index is an adaptation from Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon's 'Religious Power, the State, Women's Right and Family Law', which was also adapted from the Jonathan Fox's Religion and State database.

Since this study is essentially focusing on female development under Sharia law, Htun& Weldon's index is modified by excluding five elements that are related to both men and women and including two new variables, Polygamy and Testimony. In total it assesses formal legal equality in ten areas and coded in dichotomy with 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Unlike Htun & Weldon, only Islam related limitations are taken into account. The countries that comprise this data set are the same ones from development index analysis to show some connected outcomes between the two analyses. The minimum score indicates that a country's family laws are free from Islamic Law while the maximum score means that a country discriminates women. Htun& Weldon's Family Law Indicators Chronbach's alpha is .91, and the indicators are similar to theirs, it is simply assumed that the sets of items in this study also have relatively high internal consistency. Each element of the Islamic Family Law Index is weighed equally because of simplicity and transparency of this analysis. (Appendix Table.A5 and Table.A6)

Islamic Family Law Index Indicators
- Inheritance
- Spousal rights and duties
- Guardianship
- Right to work
- Minimum marriage age

- Divorce
- Custody after divorce
- Property after divorce
- Polygamy
- Testimony

[Table 3 Here]

Table (3) presents a comparison between Sharia law based country groups on Islamic Family Law Index and its components while Figure (3) shows the difference of Islamic Family Law Index among country groups. Some components such as Inheritance, Guardianship or Property after divorce, they are relatively higher while Divorce and Minimum age of marriage are low for every country group. However, as expected, Sharia group has the highest Islamic family law index points and it is getting lower as the effect of Sharia is lessened for each group.

[Figure 3 Here]

$$Yi = \delta_1 + \delta_2 FLI + \beta_1 lgdppercap + \beta_2 politicalstability + \beta_3 lgpop + \beta_4 urban + u_i$$

The model for the second part of the analysis is estimated as similar with the previous one but the Islamic law dummies and region dummies are not used to keep the Islamic law effect only on Islamic Family Law Index. Similarly with the previous analysis, regressions for gender related development indexes has run first as dependent variable later for each of the individual components of indexes to evaluate whether one of the components were driving the larger relationship. Lastly, in the second part of Islamic Family Law analysis, instead of Islamic family law index, the index components are added into the model separately as dummy variable to evaluate the direct relationship between the development indexes and the law in question.

IV.III. World Value Survey and Some Further Comments

Inglehart and Norris, 2003 argued that where traditional values prevail, women are not only limited by society, but also choose to limit themselves. Then it is natural to ask what individual

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factors explain support for gender inequality under Sharia? In order to examine, World Values Survey is used which evaluates attitudes, beliefs and their effects on social lives across the world.

In this study, the sixth wave of the WVS is analyzed which was conducted between 2010 and 2014. All countries available in the Wave 6 were included which is in total 59 (more information http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The total number of respondents surveyed was 68,166, 35,643 of them were female, and 32,523 were male. The dependent variables are measured in dichotomy by the questions which are related with the individual opinions for economic activity, education (Appendix Table A7). The individual variables age, income, education, and employment status have been used as independent variables. Age square is also added to model the effect a differing ages, rather than assuming the effect is linear for all ages.

$$Yi = \delta_1 + \delta_2 law + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 age^2 + \beta_3 marital + \beta_4 edu + \beta_5 emp + \beta_6 income + u_i$$

Level of education, edu is an indicator of socioeconomic status that was measured as a dummy variable. Income level, $income$, and employment status, emp, which are proxy for resources are also measured as dummy variables. To test whether the effects of marital status, $marital$, on views of gender role differ, marital status is also added as dummy variable and the analysis has been run separately for males and females (Appendix, World Value Survey).

V.   Estimation Results

In order to facilitate a review of all findings, results will be discusses in the following order; (a) cross-sectional patterns in women's and men's development based on country groups categorized by Sharia law imposition, (b) examining effects of Islamic family law over development, and (c) finally individual level factors is analyzed by using survey results from WVS.

V.I. Comparing Female and Male Development- Cross Country Analysis

The model is run for female development index first and the results showing statistical significance at the .001 level for *law* dummies Sharia and NoSharia_Islam whereas .005 level for Sharia_PersonalLaw with the negative parameter estimates. It can be said that strict Muslim countries are more likely to show lower levels of development for women. Also *lgdppercap,*

politicalstability, and *lgpop* were statistically significant at the .001 level of significance for female development all with positive parameters. Middle East& North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions show statistical significance with negative parameter estimates. On the other hand, male development index results give only meaningful result for *lgdppercap, politicalstability,*and *lgpop* with positive parameter variables. The results show that under the Islamic legislation, women are more likely to show lower development regardless of the region. While GDP, urbanization and political stability have positive effects on both sexes, females from Middle East& North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have relatively lower development levels than females from the rest of the world.

Then, model has run with each of the three dimensions of the FDI and MDI as dependent variable to evaluate whether one of them was driving larger relationship between development and degree of Sharia law legislation. First of all strong statistical relationship is found between the Islamic legal form and both women's and men's education index with negative parameters. While economics index shows statistical significance at .001 for women in Sharia law category, only .01 has found for male results in Sharia_PersonalLaw group (Table (4) and (5)).

[Table 4 Here]

[Table 5 Here]

Even though there is a strong tradition of women's activity in agriculture in Africa and Southeast Asia, female economics index gives significance in region level for only Middle East& North Africa group at .005 and for Latin America at .01 with negative sign which means women from those areas have significantly lower levels of economic development than the rest of the world. Any kind of employment mean bigger chance to access to better health and education resources for women, but working in family business or on agricultural field usually are not included in national statistics even today in most of the countries. This means we need a closer look into index indicators separately. That's why as the final stage of this data set, the model is run for individual data indicators. The relevance of additional indicators is assessed in the subsequent models presented in Table (6) and (7).

[Table 6 Here]

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[Table 7 Here]

Among female education index indicators, mean years of schooling is statistically significant for all law groups. Adult literacy rate, secondary enrolment and tertiary enrollment variables show some statistical significance for different groups with the negative parameters at the different level of significance. However labor force participation shows a larger and more explanatory relationship than estimated income and education indicators for religions based country groups. The significance is at the level .001 for Sharia and Sharia Personal Law groups and all coefficients are negative. It means being employed is the main problem for females in 'most' Muslim countries rather than the income inequality. While female index parameters are negative, economics index indicators of males are positive and statistically significant.

In short, the cross-sectional model for this data set suggests that the level of Sharia law legislation shows significance in shaping education and economics dimensions for female and such relationship is linear and negative. The comparison is also supporting the argument about unequal treatment between men and women by Sharia. However all these results show similar findings with the literature reviewed earlier. It does not evaluate how Sharia 'legislation' predicts the relationship between development and economic performance of women.

In 1978, Beck and Keddie argued that among Muslim societies, those that are the 'most' Muslim, in the sense of enforcing traditional restrictions on women, will have the lowest rated of female education and employment. The data provided supporting results with their argument which means not so many things has changed in those countries for females since 1970s.

V.II. Assessing Islamic Family Law Index

A new independent variable, Islamic family law index, is calculated to examine the characteristics of Sharia law for each country. The ultimate interest is in tracing changes in female development linked to Islamic family law through to changes in educational and economic development. The same model with the previous analysis is used except law dummies. The analysis reveals considerable support for hypothesis regarding variation in degree of Sharia in family law. Despite the limitations accessing constitution or family law documents, the results are still relevant and important. Coefficients represent the average effect of Islamic family law

index on the each development index and as Figure (4) and (5) show countries with higher scores on Islamic family law index tend to have lower degree of development for females.

[Figure 4 Here]

All of the coefficients for female indexes are negative and showing statistical significance at the .001 level for female development and education index whereas, .005 level for economics index and .01 for health index (Table (8)). Family law classified as strict Sharia legislation is more likely to have negative effect on levels of development for women regardless of the official religion of the country. On the other hand, only economics and education indexes of males give statistical significance at the .001 level. While female economics index coefficient is negative, male index coefficient is positive and even though both education indexes estimate negative coefficients with the same statistical significance, the female education index parameter is lower than the male variable. These results support the argument that the Islamic family law supports women less than it does for men on educational attainment and economic activities.

[Figure 5 Here]
[Table 8 Here]

Later, the model is run for each data indicator that used to calculate index dimensions. The relevance of additional indicators is assessed in the subsequent models presented in Table (9). Among female index indicators, except log of estimated earned income (GNI), all of the coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001. Similarly, male index indicators also show significance except primary enrollment rate but while male coefficient is positive, female parameter is negative which proves the different Islamic law effect on economic activities for women and men. Especially labor force participation shows a larger relationship than the rest of the indicators for both sexes.

[Table 9 Here]

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At the third stage of analysis for Islamic family law index, the Islamic family law index indicators are used individually to examine the each law effect deeper. The results of Islamic family law indicators are presented in Table (10) and (11). The results showing statistical significance at the level .001 for all law index indicators except *minimum age of marriage*. While female education index shows statistical significance at the level .001 for all ten indicators, economics index shows at the level .005 for *inheritance, guardianship, divorce, property after divorce,* and *polygamy*. On the other hand, male development and health indexes indicate no statistical significance for any of the indicator yet all coefficients for male economics index are positive and statistically significant.

[Table 10 Here]

[Table 11 Here]

V.III. Predicting Support for Gender Equality

Table (13) presents summary statics on social opinions about role of women. In terms of similarities, male respondents overwhelmingly considered their role over women in terms of economic and social activities. Whether a country is Muslim or not, men always agreed with passive role of women but when the country is enforcing the Islamic restrictions more strictly, women also agreed with passive role of women at higher rates. Another interesting similarity is that agreement with necessity of 'university education for only boys' is lower than other questions. This means that higher education for females are no longer a taboo even in strict Sharia countries. However as expected, majority of people whether male or female (almost 80%) believed that women are supposed stay at home without any economic activity in the 'most' strict Muslim societies whereas this rate is around 50% for non-Muslim countries.

[Table 12 Here]

For the regression results, on the Sharia based country groups all question dummies show statistical significance at the level .001 with positive coefficients which supports the idea that compared with the non-Muslim countries, in Muslim societies, the effect of gender inequality for division of social roles are deeper for both sexes (Table (13) and (14))

[Table 13 Here]

For Question 1, 'when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women' single and divorced female coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001 with negative parameters. Similarly, when the level of education is getting higher females less likely believe this statement than females with no education. Regardless of full time or part time, being employment is also significant for females. For Question 2, 'when mother works for pay, the children suffer' both age and age square coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001, positive for age and negative for age square. This means as people get older the effect of age is lessoned, in our case the support for this argument from older females is getting lower. Single and divorced coefficients also show statistical significance, with negative parameters which means single and divorced females are less likely to agree with this general role of women and her decision of working outside. Females living in low income level are also more supportive to this inequality compared with higher income level groups.

For third question dummy 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl', coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001 for single and .005 for the divorce group with negative parameters. The education dummy coefficients support the argument similar to previous two regressions. Unemployed group also shows significance whereas employed group shows no significant relation. Low income level coefficient is significant similar to question 2 which means females with lower income believe that university education is more important and necessary for boys. For Question 4, 'men make better business than women do' all but two coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001. The model presented a similar picture for all four question dummies for female respondents; single or divorced people are less supportive the social inequality between men and women, or higher education and low income level have a positive effect on females on deciding their place in economic activities.

[Table 14 Here]

Norris and Inglehart (2003) stated that men are slightly more conservative than women, clearest among Muslims, those with a university education, and the under thirty age group. The

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results of male respondents are also supporting this statement by showing statistical significance at the level .001 with positive coefficients (Table (14)).

For Question 1, male results show statistical significance for all coefficients except unemployed category. Single and divorced males are more likely against to support inequality against females for economic activity. Similar pattern can be seen for level of education as men with higher education are getting less supportive to this argument whereas being employed is also significant for males with negative coefficient. For Question 2, divorced males are less likely to support lower status of women in family and society than married and single groups. The coefficients of education level show similar results with previous regression on the other hand unemployed male respondents are most likely to support for passive role of women.

For third question dummy of male respondents, coefficients show statistical significance at the level .001 for single, primary education, secondary education, university education and unemployed groups. Single, unemployed or males with lower income believe that university education is more necessary for boys. For Question 4, similar to female results, all coefficient show statistical significance, except unemployed group (Table (13)).

VI.   Concluding Remarks

Usually the gender equality related literature touches mainly social norms with religion or state effect, yet this study emphasizes specifically the role of Islam on family law affecting the female development and social position. Three important results emerge.

First, after calculating female and male development indexes; the cross-sectional analysis results suggest that the level of Islamic law legislation shows significance in shaping education and economics dimensions for females to delay fertility and to lead to healthier generations. Also, depending on the region and political environment, Islamic countries from the same denomination may behave differently such as Afghanistan and Turkmenistan or Algeria and Tunisia. While cross-county regressions can highlight some factors that are statistically correlated with Islam related legislation, a better understanding of dynamics and the degree of the Islamic legislation at the country level is needed and that is why a new data set; Islamic family law index is coded.

Second, while Htun and Weldon stated religious is important to understanding sex discrimination in family law for all societies, in this paper, the key factor associated with unequal

family law is not any other religion but Islam in Muslim majority countries. Islamic family law index is modified to demonstrate position of woman in society and it assesses legal equality in ten areas to indicate whether or not the each element disadvantages women according to Islam law. The family law classified as strict Sharia legislation is more likely to have negative effect on levels of development for women regardless of the official religion of the country. The results support the argument that when Islamic family law legislation are fused, especially in highly devout Muslim societies, it is more difficult for females to access fundamental rights and resources than males. The regression results lend support to the argument that strict Islamic family law is a hurdle to overcome in order to improve the status of women especially in educational and economic involvement.

Third, according to the hypothesis that support for Islam influenced family laws might vary with the effects of individual variables which are shaped by social norms and traditions over centuries. Then the socioeconomic individual variables are checked by using questionnaire from World Value Survey. The regression coefficients for males and females almost for each question dummy presented that single and divorced people are less supportive to the inequality between men and women, higher education has a positive effect on both sexes when deciding the place of women in society, and men are decisively believe that it is enough for women staying at home, and raising children without any economic participation. In summary; 1) in the Muslim societies, respondents were overwhelmingly supportive to bigger roles for men in society and the more a country's legislation is Islam base, the more respondents agree with gender inequality in economic activities; 2) non-Muslim or not all populations had attitudes that are supportive for higher education of males and also females; 3) yet regardless of the degree Islamic legislation, majority of respondent agreed with sentiments that support some aspect of gender inequality in economic life. Despite the final statement of Htun and Weldon; it is the state, not the religion, thwarts advances in women's rights; yet my third stage analysis results showed that a social and individual framework hinders female development because of the traditional Islam effect and the socioeconomic positions of the population. In other words not only states but also people support, believe and even defend some of the inequalities in family law legislation. Surprisingly, serious amount of females in Muslim majority societies agree with the idea of 'lower status and labor participation for women'.

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This paper's findings simply suggest two broader conclusions relevant to female and overall social development. One is that strengthening the Islamic legislation on family law can reduce female educational attainment and economic participation in Muslim majority countries. Although some scholars have already showed similar results on this, this paper takes these topics one step further, and indicated that lower degree of female development differs by the degree of Islamic legislation of that country. The other one is that individual decisions to support of traditional gender division and lower status of females may deserve more attention than the country level variables. Countries which are now experiencing rapid increase in wealth owing to the exploitation of oil proved that there is something more effective than just GDP per capita to change the status of women in Muslim majority societies. The key to further advanced research in this area lies in better understanding the ways and the context of these social attitudes and the state's decisions of Islamic family law legislations in Muslim majority countries.

Appendix

A. Data

Table.A1 Country Groups Categorized by Islamic Law

Law	Country
Sharia	Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen
Sharia-Personal Law	Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates,
No Sharia-Islam	Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan
No Islam	Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Source of Data

Country Level Variables;

GDP (current US$): The World Bank (2014) GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates.

Urbanization: Urban population (% of total), refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.

Political Stability: Points, 2014; The World Bank; data are available for: Political stability. The index reflect the likelihood of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. The average for 2014 was -0.04 points. The highest value is in Liechtenstein: 1.48 points and the lowest value is in Syria: -2.76 points.

Population: in total, million, 2015; based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The World Bank, United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects, Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report, U.S. Census Bureau: International Database, and Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Programme.

Development Index

Life expectancy at birth: UNDESA (2015).

Mean years of schooling for adults ages 25 and older: Barro and Lee (2014), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) and Human Development Report Office updates based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015).

Adult Literacy rate: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) and Human Development Report Office updates based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015).

Net Primary Enrollment rate: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) and Human Development Report Office updates based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015).

Net Secondary Enrollment rate: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) and Human Development Report Office updates based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015).

Gross Tertiary Enrollment rate: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) and Human Development Report Office updates based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015).

GNI per capita: World Bank (2015), IMF (2015) and UNSD (2015).

Estimated earned income: Human Development Report Office estimates based on female and male shares of economically active population, ratio of female to male wage in all sectors and gross national income in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms for female and male populations from ILO (2015), IMF (2015), UNDESA (2013) and World Bank (2015).

Labor Force Participation rate age15+: World Bank (2015)

Table.A2

Index Dimension	Indicator
Health Index	Life expectancy at birth (years)
Education	Mean years of schooling
	Adult Literacy rate (%, 2015)
	Net Primary Enrollment rate (%, 2014)
	Net Secondary Enrollment rate (%, 2014)
	Gross Tertiary Enrollment rate (%, 2014)
Economics	GNI per capita (2011 PPP $)
	Labor force participation

Calculation of Estimated Earned Income

-First we estimated female and male **earned incomes.** The **share of the wage bill** is calculated for each gender. The **female share of the wage bill (S_f)** is calculated as follows:

$$S_f = \frac{W_f / W_m \cdot EA_f}{W_f / W_m \cdot EA_f + EA_m}$$

where W_f / W_m is the ratio of **female to male wage**, EA_f is the **female share of the economically active population** and EA_m is the **male share of the economically active population**. Then the **male share of the wage bi**ll is calculated as:

$$S_m = 1 - S_f$$

Estimated female earned income per capita ($GNIpc_f$) is obtained from GNI per capita (*GNIpc*), first by multiplying it by the female share of the wage bill, S_f , and then rescaling it by the female **share of the population**, $P_f = N_f / N$:

$$GNIpc_f = GNIpc \cdot S_f / P_f$$

Calculation of Development Indexes

-First minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are set in order to transform the indicators expressed in different units into indices between 0 and 1. These goalposts act as the 'natural zeros' and 'aspirational goals', respectively, from which component indicators are standardized.

Table.A3

Indicator	Minimum	Maximum
Mean years of schooling	0	15
Estimated earned income (2011 PPP $)	100	75,000
Life expectancy at birth (years)		
Female	22.5	87.5
Male	17.7	82.5

-Societies can subsist without formal education, justifying the education minimum of 0 years. The maximum for mean years of schooling for adults, 15, is the projected maximum of this indicator for 2025. The other four Education Index indicator data are percentage ratios so, 100, is the projected maximum of all four indicators whereas the minimum is simply taken as 0.

-First indicator of Economics Index is labor force participation ratio and the maximum, 100, is the projected maximum whereas the minimum is simply taken as 0.

-The minimum value for gross national income (GNI) per capita, $100, is justified by the considerable amount of unmeasured subsistence and nonmarket production in economies close to the minimum, which is not captured in the official data. The maximum is set at $75,000 per capita by the same assumption from Human Development Report of United Nations.

-As second step all indicators estimated for males and females, are transformed into indices, and then taken dimension indices for each sex separately.

-Having defined the minimum and maximum values, the dimension indices are calculated as:

$$Dimension\ index\ =\ \frac{actual\ value\ -\ minimum\ value}{maximum\ value\ -\ minimum\ value}$$

-For the Economics Index, after calculating estimated earned income per capita for each sex is calculated, dimension indexes are taken for each of the two indicators, and then the arithmetic mean of the two resulting indices is taken. Similarly, for the Education Index, after dimension indexes for each indicator, then the arithmetic mean of the five resulting indices is taken.

The FDI and MDI are the geometric mean of the three dimensional indices:

$$FDI\ =\ \left(IHealthf\ . IEducationf\ . IEconomicsf\ \right)^{1/3}$$

$$MDI\ =\ \left(IHealthm\ . IEducationm\ . IEconomicsm\ \right)^{1/3}$$

-World Bank's 2015 World Development Indicators database contains estimates of GNI per capita in 2011 PPP terms for many countries. For countries missing this indicator (entirely or partly), Human Development Report Office calculates it by converting GNI from current to constant terms. The data set is taken from Human Development Report Office.

-To obtain the income value for 2014, International Monetary Fund (IMF)–projected real GDP growth rates are applied to the most recent GNI values in constant PPP terms. The IMF-projected growth rates are calculated based on local currency terms and constant prices rather than in PPP terms. This avoids mixing the effects of the PPP conversion with those of real growth of the economy.

-For a small number of countries missing indicators, the Human Development Report Office has estimated the missing values using cross-country regression models. The details of the models used are available at http://hdr.undp.org. The estimations of Human Development Office are taken directly for all missing variables.

Table.A4 Country Profiles for Missing Data

Country	Mean male	Mean female	Literacy Male	Literacy Female	Primary Male	Primary Female	Secondary Male	Secondary Female	Labor male	Labor female	Total
Afghanistan					x	X					2
Algeria							X	x			2
Angola	x	X									2
Australia			x	X							2
Barbados			X	x							2
Belgium			x	X							2
Bosnia-Herzegovina							X	X			2
Brunei					x	X					2
Canada			X	x			X	X			4
Cape Verde	X	x									2
China					x	X	X	X			4
Congo							X	X			2
Democratic Republic of Congo							X	X			2
Denmark			x	X							2
Djibouti	x	X	X	x							4
Eritrea	X	x									2
Fiji			x	X							2
Finland			X	x							2
France			x	X							2
Gambia							X	X			2
Hong Kong			X	x							2
Iceland			x	X							2
Ireland			X	x							2
Israel			x	X							2
Ivory Coast							X	X			2
Japan			X	x							2
Liberia							X	X			2
Libya					x	X	X	X			4
Luxembourg			x	X							2
Montenegro							X	X			2
Netherlands			X	x							2
New Zealand			x	X							2
Nigeria							X	X			2
Norway			X	x							2
Palestine									x	x	2
Papua New Guinea							X	X			2

Country											Index
Russia							*X*	*X*			*2*
Rwanda							*X*	*X*			*2*
St. Lucia			*x*	*X*							*2*
Sudan							*X*	*X*			*2*
Sweden			*X*	*x*							*2*
Switzerland			*x*	*X*							*2*
Tanzania							*X*	*X*			*2*
Tunisia							*X*	*X*			*2*
United Kingdom			*X*	*x*							*2*
United States			*x*	*x*							*2*
Uzbekistan							*X*	*X*			*2*
Zambia							*x*	*X*			*2*

Islamic Family Law Index

Table.A5 Index Components

Inheritance - Men(sons, brothers, widowers) inherit more than women of equal status – the Quaranic share of a daughter is one-half the estate of her parents	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Spousal rights and duties - Men have more power over women; the law stipulates, for example, that wives must obey their husbands	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Guardianship - The father or the eldest son of the family holds and/or exercises parental power and/or legal guardianship over minor children/ females	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Right to work - Wives need their husband's permission to work and/or husbands can legally prevent their wives from working	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Minimum marriage age - No minimum age of marriage or different minimum age for women and men - Where there is no legal age for marriage, girls are often married in the late childhood.	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Divorce - Men and women do not have equal rights to divorce or the country does not permit to divorce	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Custody after divorce - The law gives fathers guardianship or custody of children following divorce, even if the mother has temporary custody	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Property after divorce – The division of property after divorce favors the man, for example, by presuming that he will keep common property such as the marital home, even if the wife keeps her own property	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Testimony – Testimony of 1 woman is equal to ½ man	1 = Yes, 0 = No
Polygamy – Men can marry more than one woman	1 = Yes, 0 = No

Table.A6 Islamic Family Law Index Scores

Country	Inheritance	Spousal rights	Guardianship	Right to Work	Min. Marriage Age	Divorce	Custody	Property After Divorce	Polygamy	Testimony	Family Law Index
Afghanistan	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*10*
Albania	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Algeria	*1*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*1*	*1*	*1*	*6*
Angola	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Argentina	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Armenia	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Australia	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Azerbaijan	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*1*

Country											
Bahrain	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	9
Bangladesh	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	7
Barbados	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belarus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Benin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brunei	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	5
Burma (Myanmar)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burundi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	7
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comoros	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Republic of Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	7
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	7
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gambia	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	9
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	9
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Indonesia	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	8

Iran	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	9
Iraq	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	6
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	7
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jordan	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	8
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Kyrgyzstan	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Laos	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	7
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Libya	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	8
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Macedonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Madagascar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maldives	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	9
Mali	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	7
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	8
Mauritius	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	6
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nepal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	7
Nigeria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oman	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	7
Pakistan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Palestine	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	8
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qatar	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St. Lucia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
São Tomé and Príncipe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Senegal	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	7
Serbia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone											2

Country											Total
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Tanzania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tonga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tunisia	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Arab Emirates	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	7
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
Vanuatu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yemen	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	9
Zambia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

World Value Survey

-All sample of Vave-6 has been used for the individuals of age 20-59 except 9556 respondent in Question1 because our coding in dichotomy 1=Agree and 0=Disagree. 9556 respondent's 'Neither' simply have been dropped.

Table.A7

Question 1 (V.45) - When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	1= Agree and 0=Disagree. Total respondents: 55,291 as 29,261 female and 26,030 male.
Question 2 (V.50) - When mother works for pay, the children suffer	1= Agree and 0=Disagree. Total respondents: 68,166 as 35,643 female and 32,523 male.
Question 3 (V.52) - A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	1= Agree and 0=Disagree. Total respondents: 68,166 as 35,643 female and 32,523 male.
Question 4 (V.53) - Men make better business than women do	1= Agree and 0=Disagree. Total respondents: 68,166 as 35,643 female and 32,523 male.

-Marital Status has been classified as 6 groups in World Value Survey and coded in WVS; 1- Married, 2- Living Together, 3- Divorced, 4- Separated, 5- Widowed and 6- Single. To create a simpler data set I recoded these 6 responses in 3 subgroups as it is shown in table.

Table.A8

Married	1- Married
Living Together, Single, Separated, Widowed	2- Single
Divorced	3- Divorced

-Education Level; 1-No formal education, 2-Incomplete primary education, 3-Complete primary education, 4-Incomplete secondary education, 5-Complete secondary education, 6-Incomplete secondary(university type) education, 7- Complete secondary(university type) education, 8-Some university level without degree, 9-University degree in WVS. I recoded them as;

Table.A9

No Education	1- No Education
Incomplete Primary, Complete Primary	2- Primary Education
Incomplete Secondary, Complete Secondary, Incomplete Secondary(Uni. Type), Complete Secondary(Uni. Type)	3- Secondary Education
Some university level without degree, University degree	4- University Education

-Employment Status has 8 responses in the WVS as 1-Full time (weekly more than 30 hours), 2-Part time (weekly less than 30 hours), 3- Self-employed, 4- Retired, 5- Housewife, 6- Student, 7- Unemployed, and 8- Others. I recoded them simply in three subgroups.

Table.A10

Full time, Part time, Self-employed, Retired	1- Employed
Housewife, Unemployed, Others	2- Unemployed
Student	3- Student

-Income Level has been described as a scale from 1 to 10 as 1 represents the Lowest whereas 10 the Highest. I recoded the all responses to make a simple comparison between the low level income group and others. Here, there is no middle or high income group because it is assumed that after some level of income it is not as hard as to reach some opportunities. WVS's income scale has been coded as;

Table.A11

1- 2- 3	1- Low Income
4- 5- 6- 7- 8- 9- 10	2- Mid-High Income

B. Tables

Table 1. Summary Statistics, Development Index and Index Indicators

	Female						*Male*				
	All Countries		Sharia	Sharia Personal Law	No Sharia_Islam	No Islam	All Countries		Sharia	Sharia Personal Law	No Sharia_Islam	No Islam
Development Index	0.54	0.13	0.35	0.49	0.47	0.58	0.64	0.12	0.59	0.65	0.56	0.65
Economics Index	0.34	0.12	0.14	0.27	0.30	0.37	0.51	0.16	0.51	0.59	0.44	0.50
Labor Force Participation	0.53	0.17	0.22	0.39	0.54	0.57	0.75	0.09	0.77	0.78	0.76	0.74
GNI Index	0.15	0.16	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.17	0.28	0.30	0.26	0.42	0.12	0.27
Education Index	0.65	0.20	0.45	0.62	0.53	0.69	0.66	0.16	0.55	0.63	0.58	0.69
Mean Years Schooling	0.51	0.23	0.26	0.45	0.37	0.56	0.56	0.19	0.41	0.51	0.46	0.60
Primary Enrolment	0.89	0.13	0.80	0.87	0.83	0.91	0.90	0.11	0.84	0.88	0.87	0.91
Secondary Enrolment	0.69	0.26	0.47	0.71	0.50	0.72	0.68	0.24	0.56	0.69	0.55	0.70
Tertiary Enrolment	0.40	0.32	0.22	0.33	0.26	0.44	0.32	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.35
Adult Literacy Rate	0.80	0.22	0.58	0.83	0.66	0.84	0.87	0.15	0.76	0.90	0.76	0.89
Health Index (Life Expectancy)	0.78	0.14	0.71	0.79	0.71	0.79	0.79	0.12	0.74	0.80	0.72	0.79

Note: The table above shows the sample mean and standard deviations for all counries and only sample means for other religious based country groups.

Table 2. Summary Statistics, Country Level Variables

	All Countries		Sharia	Sharia Personal Law	No Sharia_Islam	No Islam
Panel A: Independent Variables						
lnGdp	9.09	1.22	8.79	9.36	8.30	9.17
lnUrban	3.91	0.51	3.79	4.11	3.66	3.92
lnPop	2.19	1.77	3.57	2.06	2.51	2.08
Political Stability Index	-0.16	0.95	-1.75	-0.52	-0.65	0.09
Panel B: Region Effects						
East Asia&Pacific	0.12	0.33	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.15
Europe&Central Asia	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.30
Latin America	0.16	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22
Middle East&NorthAfrica	0.13	0.34	0.50	0.61	0.06	0.02
North America	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
South Asia	0.05	0.22	0.25	0.09	0.00	0.03
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.26	0.44	0.25	0.17	0.44	0.26

Note: The table above shows the sample mean and standard deviations for all counries and only sample means for religious based country groups.

Table 3. Summary Statistics, Family Law Index

	All Countries		Sharia	Sharia Personal Law	No Sharia_Islam	No Islam
Panel A: Family Law Index						
Family Law Index	1.99	(3.508)	9.00	7.57	3.19	0.23
Panel B: Components of Family Law Index						
Inheritance	0.23	(0.424)	1.00	0.91	0.31	0.03
Spousal Rights	0.20	(0.398)	1.00	0.74	0.25	0.03
Guardianship	0.25	(0.432)	1.00	0.91	0.50	0.03
Right to Work	0.18	(0.389)	1.00	0.61	0.31	0.03
Minimum Marriage Age	0.16	(0.367)	0.63	0.52	0.44	0.02
Divorce	0.20	(0.398)	0.75	0.87	0.25	0.02
Child Custody	0.16	(0.367)	0.75	0.52	0.31	0.03
Property After Divorce	0.23	(0.420)	1.00	0.83	0.44	0.03
Polygamy	0.23	(0.424)	0.88	0.96	0.38	0.03
Testimony	0.15	(0.361)	1.00	0.70	0.00	0.01

Note: The table above shows the sample mean and standard deviations for all countries (standard deviations reported in parantheses) and sample means for religious based country groups.

Table 4. Cross-Country Estimation Results for Religious Dummies_FEMALE

Key Control	(1) Development Index	(2) Economics Index	(3) Education Index	(4) Health Index
Sharia	-0.1137*** (0.0235)	-0.1381*** (0.0366)	-0.1163*** (0.0391)	-0.0084 (0.0290)
Sharia_PersonalLaw	-0.0349** (0.0164)	-0.0419 (0.0255)	-.0433 (0.0273)	-0.0003 (0.0203)
NoSharia_Islam	-0.0464*** (0.0151)	-0.0354 (0.0234)	-0.0711*** (0.0250)	-0.0163 (0.0186)
lnGdp	0.0543*** (0.0071)	0.0506*** (0.0110)	0.0678*** (0.0117)	0.0196** (0.0087)
lnUrban	0.0004 (0.0128)	-0.0235 (0.0198)	0.0212 (0.0212)	0.0267* (0.0157)
Political Stability Index	0.0346*** (0.0078)	0.0319*** (0.0121)	0.0232* (0.0130)	0.0369*** (0.0096)
lnPop	0.0078*** (0.0029)	0.0082* (0.0046)	0.0055 (0.0049)	0.0063* (0.0036)
East Asia&Pacific	-0.0543 (0.0401)	-0.0767 (0.0623)	-0.0456 (0.0666)	-0.0165 (0.0494)
Europe&Central Asia	-0.0143 (0.0388)	-0.0743 (0.0603)	0.0545 (0.0644)	0.0238 (0.0478)
Latin America	-0.0618 (0.0400)	-0.1138* (0.0622)	-0.0352 (0.0664)	0.0040 (0.0493)
MiddleEast&North Africa	-0.1030** (0.0428)	-0.1347** (0.0665)	-0.0624 (0.0711)	0.0016 (0.0528)
South Asia	-0.1000** (0.0442)	-0.0976 (0.0686)	-0.1463** (0.0733)	-0.0344 (0.0545)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0876** (0.0410)	0.0070 (0.0637)	-0.1837*** (0.0681)	-0.1762*** (0.0506)
Adj. R^2	0.85	0.56	0.84	0.81
Observations	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00

Note 1: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.
Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' and for Region fixed effects; North America.

Table 5. Cross-Country Estimation Results for Religious Dummies_MALE

Key Control	(1) Development Index	(2) Economics Index	(3) Education Index	(4) Health Index
Sharia	-0.0044 (0.0199)	0.0415 (0.0426)	-0.0699** (0.0309)	0.0134 (0.0281)
Sharia_PersonalLaw	-0.0012 (0.0139)	0.0572* (0.0297)	-0.0552** (0.0216)	-0.0001 (0.0196)
NoSharia_Islam	-0.0089 (0.0127)	0.0361 (0.0273)	-0.0514** (0.0198)	-0.0046 (0.0180)
lnGdp	0.0628*** (0.0060)	0.1073*** (0.0128)	0.0469*** (0.0093)	0.0206** (0.0084)
lnUrban	0.0086 (0.0108)	-0.0264 (0.0231)	0.0306* (0.0168)	0.0265* (0.0153)
Political Stability Index	0.0290*** (0.0066)	0.0336** (0.0141)	0.0105 (0.0103)	0.0462*** (0.0093)
lnPop	0.0093*** (0.0025)	0.0094* (0.0053)	0.0092** (0.0039)	0.0066* (0.0035)
East Asia&Pacific	-0.0161 (0.0338)	-0.0232 (0.0726)	0.0050 (0.0527)	-0.0210 (0.0479)
Europe&Central Asia	-0.0057 (0.0327)	-0.0691 (0.0702)	0.0815 (0.0510)	-0.0029 (0.0464)
Latin America	-0.0276 (0.0338)	-0.0371 (0.0724)	-0.0254 (0.0526)	-0.0097 (0.0478)
MiddleEast&North Africa	0.0149 (0.0361)	0.0436 (0.0775)	-0.0059 (0.0562)	0.0221 (0.0512)
South Asia	-0.0285 (0.0373)	-0.0113 (0.0799)	-0.0688 (0.0580)	0.0028 (0.0528)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0615* (0.0346)	0.0522 (0.0742)	-0.1225** (0.0539)	-0.1385*** (0.0490)
Adj. R^2	0.8814	0.6515	0.8259	0.7751
Observations	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00

Note 1: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.
Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' and for Region fixed effects; North America.

Table 6. Cross_Country Estimation Results of Index Indicators_FEMALE

Key Control	(1) Labor Force Participation	(2) lnGNI	(3) Mean Years Schooling	(4) Adult Litearcy Rate	(5) Primary Enrolment	(6) Secondary Enrolment	(7) Tertiary Enrolment
Sharia	-0.2689***	-0.0074	-0.1508***	-0.1323**	-0.0314	-0.1339**	-.0861
	(0.0519)	(0.0374)	(0.0513)	(0.0589)	(0.0451)	(0.0612)	(0.0760)
Sharia_PersonalLaw	-0.0976***	0.0138	-0.0695*	0.0030	-0.0318	-0.0076	-0.0910*
	(0.0363)	(0.0261)	(0.0360)	(0.0427)	(0.0310)	(0.0437)	(0.0530)
NoSharia_Islam	-0.0528	-0.0180	-0.0995***	-0.1322***	-0.0156	-0.0334	-0.0801
	(0.0333)	(0.0240)	(0.0329)	(0.0371)	(0.0276)	(0.0394)	(0.0486)
lnGdp	-0.0103	0.1116***	0.0908***	0.0926***	0.0087	0.0845***	0.0734***
	(0.0156)	(0.0112)	(0.0159)	(0.0184)	(0.0132)	(0.0177)	(0.0228)
lnUrban	-0.0440	-0.0030	0.0031	-0.0534	-0.0332	0.0133	0.1762***
	(0.0282)	(0.0203)	(0.0283)	(0.0343)	(0.0233)	(0.0323)	(0.0412)
Political Stability Index	0.0416**	0.0223*	-0.0011	0.0165	0.0730***	0.0323	0.0046
	(0.0172)	(0.0124)	(0.0170)	(0.0198)	(0.0149)	(0.0204)	(0.0252)
lnPop	0.0143**	0.0020	-0.0088	-0.0071	0.0168***	0.0056	0.0197**
	(0.0065)	(0.0047)	(0.0065)	(0.0077)	(0.0056)	(0.0075)	(0.0095)
East Asia&Pacific	-0.0074	-0.1461**	-0.1853**	0.1732***	0.0554	0.0201	-0.1440
	(0.0885)	(0.0637)	(0.0874)	(0.0594)	(0.0738)	(0.1296)	(0.1294)
Europe&Central Asia	-0.0139	-0.1347**	-0.0791	0.2892***	0.0711	0.0995	0.0277
	(0.0856)	(0.0617)	(0.0845)	(0.0616)	(0.0709)	(0.1267)	(0.1253)
Latin America	-0.0132	-0.2145***	-0.2058**	0.2211***	0.0697	-0.0002	-0.1733
	(0.0883)	(0.0636)	(0.0872)	(0.0626)	(0.0731)	(0.1290)	(0.1292)
MiddleEast&North Africa	-0.0758	-0.1934***	-0.2482***	0.1421**	0.1179	-0.0262	-0.2110
	(0.0945)	(0.0681)	(0.0932)	(0.0643)	(0.0788)	(0.1357)	(0.1382)
South Asia	-0.0219	-0.1734**	-0.3403***	0.0000 (.)	0.0456	-0.0396	-0.2595*
	(0.0975)	(0.0702)	(0.0963)		(0.0809)	(0.1363)	(0.1426)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.1198	-0.1057	-0.3183***	0.0489	-0.0342	-0.2390*	-0.3148**
	(0.0905)	(0.0652)	(0.0899)	(0.0542)	(0.0750)	(0.1314)	(0.1324)
Adj. R^2	0.5551	0.7698	0.78	0.7133	0.4886	0.8031	0.7444
Observations	160.00	160.00	156.00	136.00	156.00	140.00	160.00

Note 1: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.
Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' and for Region fixed effects; North America.

Table 7. Cross_Country Estimation Results of Index Indicators_MALE

Key Control	(1) Labor Force Participation	(2) lnGNI	(3) Mean Years Schooling	(4) Adult Litearcy Rate	(5) Primary Enrolment	(6) Secondary Enrolment	(7) Tertiary Enrolment
Sharia	0.0026	0.0803	-0.1107**	-0.0854*	-0.0296	-0.0568	-0.0359
	(0.0317)	(0.0702)	(0.0443)	(0.0445)	(0.0439)	(0.0570)	(0.0629)
Sharia_PersonalLaw	0.0388*	0.0757	-0.0847***	-0.0143	-0.0467	-0.0255	-0.1047**
	(0.0222)	(0.0490)	(0.0311)	(0.0321)	(0.0302)	(0.0406)	(0.0439)
NoSharia_Islam	0.0420**	0.0302	-0.0958***	-0.1081***	0.0029	0.0071	-0.0553
	(0.0203)	(0.0449)	(0.0284)	(0.0281)	(0.0269)	(0.0366)	(0.0402)
lnGdp	0.0054	0.2092***	0.0660***	0.0555***	0.0111	0.0727***	0.0417**
	(0.0095)	(0.0211)	(0.0137)	(0.0138)	(0.0128)	(0.0165)	(0.0189)
lnUrban	-0.0312*	-0.0215	0.0215	-0.0091	-0.0298	0.0192	0.1578***
	(0.0172)	(0.0381)	(0.0245)	(0.0258)	(0.0227)	(0.0300)	(0.0341)
Political Stability Index	0.0084	0.0587**	-0.0103	0.0051	0.0531***	0.0260	-0.0095
	(0.0105)	(0.0233)	(0.0147)	(0.0150)	(0.0145)	(0.0190)	(0.0209)
lnPop	0.0075*	0.0114	-0.0058	-0.0023	0.0135**	0.0089	0.0276***
	(0.0040)	(0.0088)	(0.0056)	(0.0058)	(0.0055)	(0.0069)	(0.0078)
East Asia&Pacific	0.0436	-0.0900	-0.1463*	0.0974**	0.0520	0.0196	-0.0131
	(0.0540)	(0.1196)	(0.0755)	(0.0445)	(0.0719)	(0.1206)	(0.1071)
Europe&Central Asia	-0.0191	-0.1190	-0.0573	0.1742***	0.0539	0.1171	0.0818
	(0.0523)	(0.1157)	(0.0730)	(0.0463)	(0.0691)	(0.1179)	(0.1036)
Latin America	0.1157**	-0.1899	-0.2262***	0.0972**	0.0520	-0.0190	-0.1148
	(0.0539)	(0.1194)	(0.0753)	(0.0471)	(0.0713)	(0.1200)	(0.1069)
MiddleEast&North Africa	0.0676	0.0197	-0.2018**	0.0990**	0.1191	0.0063	-0.1093
	(0.0577)	(0.1277)	(0.0832)	(0.0485)	(0.0768)	(0.1262)	(0.1144)
South Asia	0.0981	-0.1206	-0.2505***	0.0000	0.0439	-0.0356	-0.1371
	(0.0596)	(0.1318)	(0.0832)	(.)	(0.0788)	(0.1268)	(0.1180)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.1044*	0.0000	-0.2755***	0.0042	-0.0372	-0.2284*	-0.1898*
	(0.0553)	(0.1224)	(0.0777)	(0.0410)	(0.0731)	(0.1223)	(0.1096)
Adj. R^2	0.4226	0.7628	0.7557	0.6542	0.4148	0.7987	0.7024
Observations	160.00	160.00	156.00	137.00	156.00	140.00	160.00

Note 1: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.

Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' and for Region fixed effects; North America.

Table 8. Cross-Country Estimation Results for Islamic Family Law Index

Key Controls	Panel A. Female				Panel B. Male			
	Development Index	Economics Index	Education Index	Health Index	Development Index	Economics Index	Education Index	Health Index
Family Law Index	-0.0101***	-0.0051**	-0.0179***	-0.0044*	0.0004	0.0154***	-0.0144***	0.0001
	(0.0015)	(0.0024)	(0.0026)	(0.0023)	(0.0012)	(0.0025)	(0.0021)	(0.0020)
lnGdp	0.0601***	0.0146	0.1161***	0.0727***	0.0798***	0.0845***	0.0905***	0.0624***
	(0.0063)	(0.0102)	(0.0109)	(0.0095)	(0.0051)	(0.0104)	(0.0089)	(0.0084)
lnUrbanization	0.0048	-0.0207	0.0359	0.0255	0.0108	-0.0163	0.0331*	0.0204
	(0.0130)	(0.0209)	(0.0225)	(0.0195)	(0.0105)	(0.0213)	(0.0183)	(0.0172)
Political Stability	0.0465***	0.0655***	0.0105	0.0182	0.0219***	0.0399***	-0.0030	0.0289***
	(0.0075)	(0.0120)	(0.0129)	(0.0112)	(0.0060)	(0.0122)	(0.0105)	(0.0099)
lnpopulation	0.0109***	0.0145***	0.0047	0.0039	0.0080***	0.0068	0.0092**	0.0045
	(0.0030)	(0.0048)	(0.0051)	(0.0044)	(0.0024)	(0.0049)	(0.0042)	(0.0039)
Adj. R^2	0.81	0.39	0.77	0.64	0.86	0.63	0.74	0.64
Observations	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00	160.00

Notes: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.

Table 9. Cross_Country Estimation Results of Development Index Indicators for Islamic Family Law Index

Panel A. Female

Key Controls	Labor Force Participation	GNI Index	Mean Years Schooling	Adult Litearcy Rate	Primary Enrolment	Secondary Enrolment	Tertiary Enrolment
Family Law Index	-0.0145***	0.0043*	-0.0222***	-0.0226***	-0.0071***	-0.0152***	-.0213***
	(0.0034)	(0.0023)	(0.0033)	(0.0036)	(0.0027)	(0.0042)	(0.0050)
lnGdp	-0.0651***	0.0944***	0.1318***	0.1433***	0.0434***	0.1533***	0.1344***
	(0.0143)	(0.0097)	(0.0141)	(0.0155)	(0.0109)	(0.0180)	(0.0208)
lnUrbanization	-0.0357	-0.0058	0.0201	-0.0124	-0.0284	0.0203	0.1780***
	(0.0294)	(0.0200)	(0.0290)	(0.0320)	(0.0222)	(0.0362)	(0.0427)
Political Stability	0.0811***	0.0499***	0.0024	0.0005	0.0459***	0.0185	0.0050
	(0.0169)	(0.0115)	(0.0163)	(0.0187)	(0.0133)	(0.0214)	(0.0245)
lnpopulation	0.0210***	0.0081*	-0.0044	-0.0074	0.0121**	0.0064	0.0252**
	(0.0067)	(0.0046)	(0.0066)	(0.0078)	(0.0053)	(0.0083)	(0.0097)
Adj. R^2	0.3986	0.7229	0.7163	0.6619	0.4274	0.6888	0.6583
Observations	160.00	160.00	156.00	136.00	156.00	140.00	160.00

Panel B. Male

Key Controls	Labor Force Participation	GNI Index	Mean Years Schooling	Adult Litearcy Rate	Primary Enrolment	Secondary Enrolment	Tertiary Enrolment
Family Law Index	0.0072***	0.0236***	-0.0191***	-0.0153***	-0.0054**	-0.0118***	-0.0185***
	(0.0021)	(0.0041)	(0.0029)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
lnGdp	-0.0180**	0.1869***	0.1070***	0.0961***	0.0428***	0.1443***	0.0914***
	(0.0089)	(0.0173)	(0.0125)	(0.0114)	(0.0107)	(0.0174)	(0.0173)
lnUrbanization	-0.0263	-0.0064	0.0194	0.0082	-0.0285	0.0241	0.1434***
	(0.0182)	(0.0354)	(0.0257)	(0.0236)	(0.0217)	(0.0350)	(0.0356)
Political Stability	0.0098	0.0701***	-0.0075	-0.0113	0.0287**	0.0041	-0.0093
	(0.0105)	(0.0203)	(0.0144)	(0.0138)	(0.0130)	(0.0206)	(0.0204)
lnpopulation	0.0046	0.0091	0.0004	-0.0031	0.0094*	0.0096	0.0337***
	(0.0042)	(0.0081)	(0.0058)	(0.0057)	(0.0052)	(0.0081)	(0.0081)
Adj. R^2	0.1954	0.7449	0.6679	0.6134	0.3359	0.6575	0.5976
Observations	160.00	160.00	156.00	137.00	156.00	140.00	160.00

Notes: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.

Table 10. Cross-Country Estimation Results for Islamic Family Law Indicators_FEMALE

Key Controls	Development Index	Adj. R²	Economics Index	Adj. R²	Education Index	Adj. R²	Health Index	Adj. R²
Inheritance	-0.0771*** (0.0129)	0.8019	-0.0519** (0.0201)	0.3956	-0.1200*** (0.0229)	0.7460	-0.0208 (0.0190)	0.6296
Spousal Rights	-0.0776*** (0.0132)	0.8003	-0.0339 (0.0209)	0.3801	-0.1433*** (0.0227)	0.7622	-0.0424** (0.0193)	0.6381
Guardianship	-0.0870*** (0.0117)	0.8200	-0.0478** (0.0193)	0.3936	-0.1454*** (0.0207)	0.7732	-0.0408** (0.0180)	0.6388
Right to Work	-0.0723*** (0.0138)	0.7928	-0.0265 (0.0214)	0.3756	-0.1361*** (0.0236)	0.7538	-0.0463** (0.0196)	0.6397
Minimum Age of Marriage	-0.0380** (0.0150)	0.7656	0.0009 (0.0220)	0.3695	-0.0980*** (0.0255)	0.7270	-0.0186 (0.0204)	0.6288
Divorce	-0.0708*** (0.0130)	0.7952	-0.0400** (0.0202)	0.3852	-0.1381*** (0.0221)	0.7615	-0.0302 (0.0188)	0.6329
Child Custody	-0.0595*** (0.0145)	0.7798	-0.0084 (0.0220)	0.3700	-0.1340*** (0.0243)	0.7500	-0.0301 (0.0203)	0.6320
Property After Divorce	-0.0752*** (0.0126)	0.8014	-0.0435** (0.0198)	0.3885	-0.1199*** (0.0224)	0.7477	-0.0302 (0.0186)	0.6330
Polygamy	-0.0792*** (0.0120)	0.8094	-0.0448** (0.0192)	0.3909	-0.1353*** (0.0211)	0.7640	-0.0310* (0.0180)	0.6338
Testimony	-0.0916*** (0.0149)	0.8040	-0.0704*** (0.0232)	0.4050	-0.1196*** (0.0273)	0.7340	-0.0296 (0.0221)	0.6311
Observations	160.00		160.00		160.00		160.00	

Notes: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.

Table 11. Cross-Country Estimation Results for Islamic Family Law Indicators_MALE

Key Controls	Development Index	Adj. R²	Economics Index	Adj. R²	Education Index	Adj. R²	Health Index	Adj. R²
Inheritance	0.0100 (0.0102)	0.8598	0.1081*** (0.0214)	0.6037	-0.0934*** (0.0187)	0.7123	0.0125 (0.0167)	0.6443
Spousal Rights	-0.0016 (0.0105)	0.8589	0.1171*** (0.0217)	0.6116	-0.1155*** (0.0185)	0.7335	-0.0091 (0.0171)	0.6437
Guardianship	-0.0058 (0.0098)	0.8592	0.1038*** (0.0205)	0.6042	-0.1172*** (0.0169)	0.7458	-0.0049 (0.0160)	0.6432
Right to Work	-0.0008 (0.0107)	0.8589	0.1128*** (0.0224)	0.6033	-0.1057*** (0.0194)	0.7201	-0.0130 (0.0175)	0.6443
Minimum Age of Marriage	0.0113 (0.0109)	0.8599	0.1215*** (0.0227)	0.6104	-0.0880*** (0.0204)	0.7018	0.0057 (0.0179)	0.6432
Divorce	0.0010 (0.0101)	0.8589	0.1145*** (0.0210)	0.6129	-0.1151*** (0.0178)	0.7374	0.0029 (0.0166)	0.6431
Child Custody	0.0056 (0.0109)	0.8591	0.1313*** (0.0224)	0.6227	-0.1104*** (0.0197)	0.7225	0.0030 (0.0179)	0.6431
Property After Divorce	-0.0008 (0.0100)	0.8589	0.0271** (0.0128)	0.5820	-0.0887*** (0.0185)	0.7094	-0.0016 (0.0164)	0.6430
Polygamy	0.0014 (0.0097)	0.8589	0.1109*** (0.0201)	0.6142	-0.1112*** (0.0170)	0.7383	0.0039 (0.0159)	0.6431
Testimony	0.0102 (0.0118)	0.8596	0.1137*** (0.0253)	0.5919	-0.0895*** (0.0223)	0.6974	0.0068 (0.0194)	0.6433
Observations	160.00		160.00		160.00		160.00	

Notes: The standard errors of regression coefficients, reported in parentheses, are clustered on county. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence, double 95%, triple 99%.

Table 12. Descriptive Comparison, World Value Survey

	All Countries		No Islam		No Sharia_Islam		Sharia_Personal Law		Sharia	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Question1	0.43	0.58	0.29	0.43	0.64	0.79	0.69	0.82	0.71	0.87
Question2	0.48	0.53	0.43	0.45	0.46	0.55	0.61	0.67	0.68	0.83
Question3	0.23	0.32	0.19	0.26	0.29	0.39	0.31	0.43	0.40	0.49
Question4	0.40	0.55	0.31	0.44	0.55	0.70	0.56	0.72	0.60	0.85

Note1: Question1: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Question2: When mother works for pay, the children suffer.
Question3: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
Question4: Men make better business than women do.
Note2: The table above shows the sample means of 'Agree' for all religios based country groups.

Table 13. Estimation Results for World Value Survey Vave 6, Female Respondents

	Question1	Question 2	Question 3	Question 4
Panel A: Law				
No Sharia_Islam	0.3287***	0.0196**	0.0941***	0.2184***
Sharia_Personal Law	0.3634***	0.1505***	0.1046***	0.2161***
Sharia	0.3009***	0.1153***	0.1271***	0.1748***
Panel B: Individual Variables				
Age	-0.0013	0.0114***	-0.0020	-0.0060***
Age2	0.0000	-0.0002***	0.0000	0.0001***
Single	-0.0929***	-0.0280***	-0.0201***	-0.0618***
Divorced	-0.0945***	-0.0285**	-0.0213**	-0.0235**
Primary Education	-0.0804***	-0.0481***	-0.1109***	-0.1175***
Secondary Education	-0.1275***	-0.1540***	-0.1516***	-0.1775***
University Education	-0.2304***	-0.1971***	-0.2361***	-0.2635***
Employed	-0.0441***	-0.0629***	-0.0133	-0.0347***
Unemployed	0.0509***	0.0625***	0.0223**	0.0294***
Low Income Level	0.0079	0.0271***	-0.0136***	0.0114**
R2	0.1897	0.0677	0.0480	0.0913
N	29261.00		35643.00	

Note: Q1: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Q2: When mother works for pay, the children suffer.
Q3: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
Q4: Men make better business than women do.
Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' , for Marital Status; 'Married', for Education; 'No Education', for Employed Status; 'Student' and for Income Level; 'Mid-High Income' are taken as reference.

Table 14. Estimation Results for World Value Survey Vave 6, Male Respondents

	Question1	Question 2	Question 3	Question 4
Panel A: Law				
No Sharia_Islam	0.3477***	0.0982***	0.1276***	0.2528***
Sharia_Personal Law	0.3715***	0.2083***	0.1691***	0.2688***
Sharia	0.3833***	0.3280***	0.1989***	0.3614***
Panel B: Individual Variables				
Age	-0.0074***	0.0005	-0.0019	-0.0079***
Age2	0.0001**	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0001**
Single	-0.1106***	-0.0564***	-0.0437***	-0.0765***
Divorced	-0.0732***	-0.0678***	-0.0287*	-0.0303*
Primary Education	-0.0482***	-0.0522***	-0.0697***	-0.0737***
Secondary Education	-0.0979***	-0.1484***	-0.1038***	-0.1238***
University Education	-0.1812***	-0.1866***	-0.1763***	-0.1801***
Employed	-0.0312***	-0.0125	-0.0180*	-0.0266***
Unemployed	0.0161	0.0408***	0.0489***	0.0070
Low Income Level	0.0325***	0.0443***	0.0133***	0.0331***
R2	0.1688	0.0673	0.0479	0.0975
N	26030.00		32523.00	

Note: Q1: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Q2: When mother works for pay, the children suffer.
Q3: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
Q4: Men make better business than women do.
Note 2: For all models the religious reference group is 'No Religion' , for Marital Status; 'Married', for Education; 'No Education; 'No Education', for Employed Status; 'Student' and for Income Level; 'Mid-High Income' are taken as reference.

C. Figures

### Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

Figure 5.

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